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submitted, therefore, that when a plaintiff attempts to include additional parties as defendants in his action, filing a supplemental
summons with a county clerk before the motion for leave to serve
the new defendants is made does not suffice to afford the plaintiff
the benefit of the 203(b)(5) toll. Consequently, since satisfactory
filing with the county clerk is a prerequiste to obtaining the additional time within which to serve the new defendants,33 the service
upon the defendants in Dowling after the limitations period had
expired, even though the motion for leave eventually was granted,
would appear untimely.4

Steven J. Gartner

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW

Actions in breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation
against private educational institution will not be entertained
when allegations of complaint attack quality of education
It has been widely held that an educational malpractice claim
asserted against a public school for failure adequately to educate
its students is not actionable. 5 Notwithstanding the apparent conmade before the limitations period expired, and was granted after the statute of limitations
terminated. Id. at 436, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 629. In Dowling, however, the motion for leave to
serve the new defendants was not made until after the supplemental summons had been
filed with the county clerk, and the defendants were not served until after the prescribed
statutory period had expired. Id. This was not the situation presented in Vastola, and thus,
it is submitted that its reasoning is inapplicable to the circumstances of Dowling.
33 CPLR 203(b)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
See Arnold v. Mayal Realty Co., 299 N.Y. 57, 85 N.E.2d 616 (1949). In Arnold, the
Court of Appeals considered whether the date of the commencement of the action, for purposes of determining the applicability of the statute of limitations, is the date on which the
motion for leave to serve a supplemental summons is made, or the date on which the supplemental summons and amended complaint actually are served. Id. at 60, 85 N.E.2d at 617.
The Court favored the latter date, stating that "a Statute of Limitations is not open to
discretionary change by the courts, no matter how compelling the circumstances." Id. Moreover, timely service of a codefendant will not aid a plaintiff seeking to bring a new defendant into the action through service of a supplemental summons; the statute of limitations
will expire if the additional defendant is not served within the prescribed period. Miller v.
Farina, 58 App. Div. 2d 731, 732, 395 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (4th Dep't 1977); see WK&M §
203.05, at 2-67 (1982 & Supp. 1982).
21See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825-28,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861-63 (1976); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 484, 439 A.2d 582,
586 (1982); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 125-26, 400 N.E.2d 317, 319-20, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 445,
391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979). In Donohue, the plaintiff showed that,

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:615

tractual relationship between a private school and its students,"
despite his receipt of a diploma from the Copiague High School, he "lack[ed] even the rudimentary ability to comprehend written English on a level sufficient to enable him to complete applications for employment." 47 N.Y.2d at 442, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at
376-77. The plaintiff sought damages of $5,000,000, alleging that the school promoted him to
each successive grade without evaluating his mental capabilities, and that the school failed
to provide adequate teachers, psychologists, and other personnel to test and evaluate him.
Id., 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The claim was framed in terms of educational
malpractice and negligent breach of a constitutionally imposed duty to educate. Id. at 443,
391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The Court of Appeals held that, even though the
educational malpractice allegations met the formal pleading requirements, as a matter of
public policy the Court should not entertain such claims. Id. Noting that the legislative and
constitutional system for the control and maintenance of the public school system "is vested
in the Board of Regents and the Commissioner of Education," id. at 444, 391 N.E.2d at
1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78, the Court stated that the purpose behind this system was to
remove educational controversies from the courts, id., 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at
378. The Court observed that if it recognized such a cause of action, it would be required to
review overall educational policies and their everyday implementation, which it refused to
do absent exceptional circumstances demonstrating "gross violations of defined public policy." Id. at 445, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378. The Court summarily dismissed
the constitutionally based claim, reasoning that the state constitution's imposition of a general obligation on the legislature to support and maintain a public school system does not
create a duty that runs from the local public school district to the individual students of
that district. Id. at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
In Hoffman, the plaintiff was put in a class of mentally retarded children after he tested
below the norm on a standard IQ test. 49 N.Y.2d at 123-24, 400 N.E.2d at 318, 424 N.Y.S.2d
at 377-78. The child had a severe speech impediment, which prompted the testers' recommendation that the plaintiff be retested within 2 years. Id., 400 N.E.2d at 318, 424 N.Y.S.2d
at 377. No such tests were performed and the child remained in the class for 12 years, until
1969, when he was retested and scored well within the norm. Id. at 124, 400 N.E.2d at 318,
424 N.Y.S.2d at 378. Although the school's actions seemingly constituted affirmative acts of
negligence, the Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he policy considerations which prompted
our decision in Donohue apply with equal force to 'educational malpractice' actions based
upon allegations of educational misfeasance and nonfeasance." Id. at 126, 400 N.E.2d at 320,
424 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
Other public policy grounds for not recognizing a cause of action for failure to provide
an adequate education include the difficulty of determining legal cause, uncertainty of damages, lack of a readily acceptable standard of care, fear of a flood of litigation from disaffected students and parents, and an asserted lack of judicial knowledge concerning educational policy. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 82425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (1976); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 484, 439 A.2d
582, 585 (1982).
31 Cf. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 633, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412-13 (2d
Dep't) (catholic students expelled from school for marrying in a civil ceremony), aff'd, 12
N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962). In Carr, the court stated that "[w]hen
a student is duly admitted by a private university, secular or religious, there is an implied
contract between the student and the university that, if he complies with the terms prescribed by the university, he will obtain the degree which he sought." 17 App. Div. 2d at
633, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 413; see Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 83, 78 N.Y.S.
739, 740 (1st Dep't 1902); infra note 64 and accompanying text. But see Tedeschi v. Wagner
College, 49 N.Y.2d 652, 658, 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1305, 427 N.Y.S.2d 760, 763 (1980). In
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and that the Education Law provides that students attending private schools should receive an education "at least substantially
equivalent" to that received by public school students, 7 it has
been unclear whether suits3" instituted by students or their parents
against private schools are cognizable in New York. 9 Recently, in
Paladino v. Adelphi University,40 the Appellate Division, Second
Tedeschi, the Court of Appeals stated that
[a] [c]ontract theory is not wholly satisfactory [to describe a student-private
school relationship] because the essentially fictional nature of the contract results
in its generally being assumed rather than proved, because of the difficulty of its
application, and because it forecloses inquiry into, and a balancing of, the countervailing interests of the student on the one hand and the institution on the other.
Id. (citations omitted).
37 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982). Section 3204 of the Education Law provides: "Instruction given to a minor elsewhere than at a public school shall be
at least substantially equivalent to the instruction given to minors of like age and attainments at the public schools of the city or district where the minor resides." Id.; see In re
Franz, 55 App. Div. 2d 424, 426, 390 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941 (2d Dep't 1977) (standard of instruction and subject matter taught at a place other than a public school must conform to that of
the local public school board).
38In addition to claims that sound in educational malpractice, both breach of contract
and intentional tort have been advanced in other states as possible theories of recovery for a
public school's failure to educate. See, e.g., Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 483, 439
A.2d 582, 586 (1932). In Hunter, parents alleged that the board of education's employees
"intentionally and maliciously" provided them with false information about their son's
learning abilities, altered school records to conceal their actions, and demeaned the child.
Id. at 484, 439 A.2d at 583. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the parents were
entitled to attempt to produce adequate evidence to meet the "formidable" burden of proof.
Id. at 490-91, 439 A.2d at 587. According to the court, public policy considerations that
otherwise would preclude liability, see supra note 35, could not be used to shield the intentional torts of educators. 292 Md. at 490, 439 A.2d at 587. The breach of contract claim,
however, was summarily rejected by the Hunter court because "the uncertainty of damages,
the difficulty in determining legal cause, and the public policy factors precluding negligence
claims remain true whether the allegations state breach of contract or tort." Id. at 490 n.5,
439 A.2d at 586 n.5.
In a number of other cases, actions in negligence alleging a general failure to educate,
either by misfeasance or nonfeasance, have been uniformly rejected. See infra note 54 and
accompanying text. Significantly, commentators have suggested several other theories of recovery including a statutory duty to provide an effective education, promissory estoppel,
and third-party beneficiary of a contract. See generally Funston, Educational Malpractice-A Cause of Action in Search of a Theory, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 743, 759-90 (1981);
Lipsig, EducationalMalpractice-Recovery Theories Needed, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1979, at 1,
col. 1; Note, EducationalMalfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failure to Educate?, 14
TULSA L.J. 386, 390-403 (1978); Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny
Sue?, 7 FORDHAM UR. L.J. 117, 118-40 (1978).
39 But see Helm v. Professional Children's School, 103 Misc. 2d 1053, 1054, 431
N.Y.S.2d 246, 247 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1980) (claim of educational malpractice
against a private school is not cognizable because the public policy considerations that preclude such actions against public schools are "equally applicable to ... private education").
,0 89 App. Div. 2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (2d Dep't 1982).
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Department, held that breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation actions asserted against a private elementary school for
failure to supply a quality education may not be entertained by a
New York court."
In Paladino,Michael Paladino was enrolled by his parents in
the Waldorf School, a private educational institution, which he attended from the nursery school level through the fifth grade. 42 After Michael exhibited learning difficulties in 1979, 4s his parents
sought an independent evaluation of their son's academic progress.4 4 Tests administered by a private testing agency established
that Michael was not equipped with the academic skills needed by
a fifth grader and that he was "several grades below the fifth grade
level in arithmetic, reading, and writing.

'45

Upon receiving this in-

formation, the school declined to promote the child to the sixth
grade. 46 Thereafter, on behalf of his son and himself, Michael's father commenced an action alleging breach of contract 4 7 and fraudulent misrepresentation, 48 each claim based largely upon the
42Id. at 86, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
42 Id. Michael Paladino was enrolled at the Waldorf School from 1972 through 1979.
43 Id. After Michael entered the first grade, his parents began to receive reports from
the Waldorf School concerning their son's status and academic progress in each subject area.
Id.
44Id.
45Id.

46Id. The child later was enrolled in a public school in which he was required to repeat
the fifth grade. Id.
47 Id. In the complaint, Michael's father alleged that the school breached its agreement
to provide a quality education, necessary tutoring, and "qualified and expert teachers." Id.
In addition, he alleged that the school furnished false and misleading reports on Michael's
academic progress, promoting him each year when he was not qualified for the next grade.
Id. at 93, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
48Id. at 86-87, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 870. Under New York common law, four elements must
be proved by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentation:
(1) "misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure of a material fact;" (2) "intent to
deceive;" (3) "justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation;" and, (4) injury. Idrees v.
American Univ., 546 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, 4 N.Y.2d 403, 406-07, 151 N.E.2d 833, 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262 (1958).
The plaintiff must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ajax Hardware
Mfg. Corp. v. Industrial Plants Corp., 569 F.2d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1977); Simcuski v. Saeli, 44
N.Y.2d 442, 452, 377 N.E.2d 713, 719, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265 (1978).
In Paladino,the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant intentionally represented itself to
be a school of the highest quality that would provide Michael with a better education than
could be obtained at the local public school, that the child would receive individualized
tutoring when required, and that the parents would receive accurate, periodic reports on
their child's progress. 89 App. Div. 2d at 92, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873. The plaintiffs contended
that these representations were false because the progress reports were inaccurate and the
tutorial services were not provided when needed. Id.
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school's failure to provide the quality of education that it allegedly
had promised to afford.4 9 The trial court denied the school's motion for summary judgment, 50 distinguishing these causes of action
from educational malpractice suits which have been held, on public
policy grounds, to be nonactionable in the New York courts.5 1
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, 52 holding that breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation actions against private educational institutions are not
cognizable in New York when the allegations of the complaint attack the quality of the education provided. 53 Stressing that educational malpractice claims uniformly have been rejected on public
policy grounds,5 4 Justice Brown, writing for a unanimous panel,55
concluded that the same policy reasons mandate the court's refusal
to entertain breach of contract claims.5 6 After observing that the
state has established a regulatory scheme to monitor the quality of
education provided by private schools, 57 the court declared that
4989 App. Div. 2d at 86-87, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 870. The breach of contract action brought
on Michael's behalf was based upon a third-party beneficiary theory. Id.
50Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 110 Misc. 2d 314, 315, 442 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981). Special term emphasized that the school, by making the motion for summary judgment, had prevented the plaintiffs from timely discovering certain documents
supporting their claims. Id. at 316, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 39; see CPLR 3214 (1970) (motion for
summary judgment will stay discovery).
51 Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 110 Misc. 2d 314, 315, 442 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981). Special term reasoned that the educational malpractice cases in New
York were based upon "the discretionary conduct attending the educational function of an
institution," id., while the Waldorf School allegedly had acted in violation "of good faith,
reasonableness, rationality, and even basic fairness," id. The court specifically stated that
"representations, allegedly fraudulent in nature, were made to the plaintiff parent. . . ." Id.
52 Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 89 App. Div. 2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (2d Dep't 1982),
rev'g, 110 Misc. 2d 314, 442 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981).
53 Id. at 93, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
54 Id. at 87, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 870; see, e.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121,
125-26, 400 N.E.2d 317, 319-20, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union
Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 444, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979);
see also Helm v. Professional Children's School, 103 Misc. 2d 1053, 1054, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246,
247 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1980). In Helm, the court held for the first time that "courts
should not entertain a cause of action in educational negligence . . .against ...

private

schools." 103 Misc. 2d at 1054, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (emphasis added).
5' Presiding Justice Mollen and Justice Rubin, the other members of the panel, joined
in Justice Brown's decision.
51 89 App. Div. 2d at 92-93, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873. The court stated that "[t]here is
nothing novel about a contract action that would permit for judicial intervention into the
process of learning. For in effect, the claim still requires judicial displacement of complex
educational determinations made by those charged with the responsibility to instruct the
child." Id. at 90, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
57Id. at 90, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 872; see N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 5003 (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
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public policy precludes judicial consideration of a "controversy
[which] requires the examination of the efficacy of the course of
instruction. ' 58 Justice Brown also reasoned that since the Commissioner of Education may take disciplinary action against a private
school for "good cause," an alternative means exists to ensure the
quality of education obtained by schoolchildren. 59 In dictum, the
court noted that a breach of contract action might lie if the school
had provided no academic services in exchange for tuition and
fees, or if it had promised to provide specific kinds and hours of
services and failed to perform.60 With respect to the causes of action based upon the school's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation,
the second department initially observed that a knowing misrepresentation may result in the imposition of liability.6 Justice Brown
ruled, however, that misrepresentations related to the quality of
education, such as those present in the case, are not actionable because they "are not statements of facts capable of proof, but rather
opinions which ought not provide a basis for the imposition of

liability."6 2

It is submitted that the Paladino court erred in holding that a
breach of contract claim against a private educational institution
based upon the school's failure adequately to educate its students
is not actionable in New York.6 3 Unlike the situation in which a
1982); [1979] N.Y.C.R.R. § 126. But see infra note 67.
58 89 App. Div. 2d at 92, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873.

Id.
89
62 Id.
62 89
'o

at 90, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 872. But see infra note 67.
App. Div. 2d at 92, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
at 93-94, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 874; see supra note 48.
App. Div. 2d at 94, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 874; see, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Uni-

fied School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 863 (1976). But see Hunter v.
Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 490-91, 439 A.2d 582, 586-87 (1982) (plaintiffs entitled to
maintain intentional tort action against school and teachers). For a case which holds that a
student adequately had pleaded and proved fraudulent misrepresentation under New York
law, see Idrees v. American Univ., 546 F. Supp. 1342, 1349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Idrees, the
court found that the plaintiff-student established, by clear and convincing evidence, that a
medical school materially misrepresented its facilities and faculty, and that he reasonably
relied upon these representations in making his decision to attend the school. Id. In
Paladino,on the other hand, the court found that the school adequately informed the student's parents of his academic deficiencies, contrary to the plaintiffs' allegations. 89 App.
Div. 2d at 94, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 874. As for their claim that the school failed to provide the
necessary tutorial services for all 6 years of attendance, the court stated that the plaintiffs
were "relegated to contractual remedies" unless it could be shown that, at the time the
promise was made, the school did not intend to provide such services when needed. Id. at
96, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 875. But see id. at 92, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873; infra note 63.
63 See generally Lipsig, supra note 38, at 2, col. 2 (schools should be held accountable
for educational injuries caused by failure to educate adequately).
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breach of contract action is brought against a public school, an essential element of the claim, the existence of a contract to provide
an adequate education in exchange for the payment of tuition and
fees, is present in a suit instituted against a private institution. 4
Though recognition of a contract action in this instance would result in the anomoly of a private school student possessing a cause
of action which is unavailable to a public school student, 5 it is
suggested that there is no resultant unfairness since public school
students may resort to administrative remedies that are not available to pupils who attend private schools.6 Indeed, it seems that
the appellate division improperly relied upon the disciplinary provisions of the Education Law and its accompanying regulations as
4 Whereas a public school student would have "to rely on such factors as compulsory
education statutes and school regulations describing standards or courses of conduct in order to claim a contractual relationship," Note, supra note 38, at 401; Comment, Educational
Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 785-86 (1976), New York courts have recognized that,
at least with respect to private university education, an implied contract is created when the
school accepts tuition and fees in exchange for the provision of academic services, Goldstein
v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 83, 78 N.Y.S. 739, 740 (1st Dep't 1902); Samson v.
Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 148, 167 N.Y.S. 202, 204 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
aff'd mem., 181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1st Dep't 1917). See generally Note, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J. 253, 255-62 (1973).
Moreover, as the second department itself noted, if the school agrees to provide certain
services such as tutoring, its failure to supply these services will make a contract remedy
appropriate. 89 App. Div. 2d at 92, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
Additionally, a statutory obligation has been placed upon private schools to provide, at
the very least, a "substantially equivalent" education to that provided by the local public
school. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 3204 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982); see supra note 37. Thus, it
is submitted that should the school fail to provide such an education, recovery ought to be
allowed for the cost of remedial instruction, tuition and fees, based upon the school's breach
of a statutory duty. See generally Comment, Consumer Protection and Higher Education-Student Suits Against Schools, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 608, 615 & nn. 34-36.
65 See generally Funston, supra note 38, at 760-63.
08 See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 445, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 310(7) (McKinney Supp. 19811982) (any aggrieved person may appeal to the Commissioner of Education to review any
"official act or decision of any officer, school authorities or meetings concerning any other
matter" with respect to the common school system). It has been suggested that even an
administrative review is of no aid to public school students:
[S]uch procedures are meaningless unless the administrative body is somehow
forced to take affirmative action to remedy problems. In essence, the failure of the
law to provide any judicial remedy for educational malpractice removes the pressure on the system to develop its own effective internal procedure for the out-ofcourt resolution of conflicts.
Under these circumstances, reliance solely on administrative relief increases
both the likelihood and probable severity of educational injuries by eliminating
the deterrent effect on . . . misconduct.
Lipsig, supra note 38, at 2, col. 2.
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a basis for refusing to recognize a breach of contract action against
private schools, since the statute specifically exempts certain institutions, such as the Waldorf School, from its coverage. 7
By preventing purchasers and recipients of private academic
services from seeking judicial redress for the failure to be provided
with an adequate education, the court apparently has sanctioned
the nonaccountability of private educational institutions.6 8 It is
submitted, moreover, that the appellate division, in straining to respect the integrity of an educator's policy determinations, 9 unjus67 See N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 5001-5004 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982). The purposes of
sections 5001 through 5004 of the Education Law are "to require occupational and correspondence schools, business schools, and enrollment agents for such schools to conform to
specified standards, to provide for their licensing, registration, and certification respectively,
and to provide for supervision by the State Education Department." Memorandum of the
State Educ. Dep't, reprinted in [1972] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 117, 117. Furthermore, since
"[s]chools other than correspondence schools, providing kindergarten, nursery, elementary
or secondary education" specifically are exempted from the statute's licensing requirements,
N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 5001 (McKinney 1981), it becomes clear that most private schools are not
subject to disciplinary action under section 5003, id. § 5003 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982).
It therefore is submitted that, contrary to the Paladino court's assertion, there exists no
administrative scheme that insures the quality of education provided by private schools.
"0See 89 App. Div. 2d at 91-92, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73 (failure to educate adequately
is a societal problem with respect to which a breach of contract action is inappropriate); see
also Helm v. Professional Children's School, 103 Misc. 2d 1053, 1054, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246, 247
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1980) (malpractice actions against private schools not recognized). It is apparent, therefore, that relief may not be had by private school students or
their parents since both educational malpractice and breach of contract claims, based upon
the private school's failure to educate adequately, are not actionable in New York, and the
elements of a claim in intentional tort are very difficult to establish. See supra note 62.
, See 89 App. Div. 2d at 91, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873. All of the appellate division's policy
arguments can be grouped under the rubric of judicial inappropriateness to resolve the
problems of the educational system, be it public or private. Id.; see Elson, A Common Law
Remedy for the EducationalHarms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw.
U.L. REv. 641, 671 (1978). It is suggested, however, that the Paladino court's contentions
are not persuasive. First, legal cause of an injury is a question to be resolved at trial, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d 29, 41, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 883 (2d
Dep't 1978) (Suozzi, J., dissenting), and the court will have ample opportunity to study and
evaluate the facts which the parties present to support their claims, Elson, supra, at 678.
Second, even if private elementary and secondary schools were subject to the provisions of
the Education Law and the state constitution, which vest the administration of the general
school system in the Board of Regents and Commissioner of Education, see N.Y. CoNsr. art.
V, § 4; id. art. XI, § 2; N.Y. EDuc. LAw §§ 207, 305 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1982), this
should not preclude "judicial responsiveness to individuals injured by unqualified administrative functioning." Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 497, 439 A.2d 582, 590 (1982)
(Davidson, J., dissenting). Third, the fear of a flood of litigation by disaffected students and
parents should not be controlling, see 64 App. Div. 2d at 42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J.,
dissenting), since presently, such an argument is hardly more than a cliche, see Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 600 n.22 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (despite flood-of-litigation argument, Supreme Court acknowledged that students have constitutional rights).
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tifiably has ignored the detriment suffered by children who are deprived of an adequate education.7 0 As a consequence of the court's
decision, neither a judicial nor an administrative remedy is available when a private school fails to provide the bargained-for educa-

tion.7 1 It is hoped that the Court of Appeals soon will have the

opportunity to rectify this most unfortunate result.
Diane M. Trippany

A criminal defendant has no constitutionalright to standby counsel while conducting a pro se defense
The sixth amendment to the federal Constitution affords a
criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counse 7 2 and
the right to appear pro se."3 Although it appears that a defendant
70 See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d at 39, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 882-85 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
7 See supra notes 68-69
72 The sixth amendment provides that "[fin all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VI. This amendment has been held to guarantee to criminal defendants the right to effective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). The court will determine that there has been a denial of
effective representation by counsel "only when the representation given is so patently lacking in competence or adequacy that it becomes the duty of the court to be aware of it and
correct it." People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 356, 165 N.E.2d 551, 555, 197 N.Y.S.2d 697,
702 (1960).
Although the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been held
applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932), New York has afforded criminal defendants this protection independently of
the fourteenth amendment, see People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 161, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615,
412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (1978); N.Y.CoNsT. art. I, § 6; CPL § 210.15(2) (1971). Specifically,
the New York Constitution provides that "[i]n any trial in any court whatever the party
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel." N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 6; see CPL § 210.15(2) (1971). For a discussion of the right to counsel guarantees that
New York has granted to criminal defendants, see Galie, State ConstitutionalGuarantees
and Protection of Defendant's Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 157, 178-92 (1979).
13See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). The right to appear pro se has
been recognized as implicit in the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. In Faretta,the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he right of an accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the
grain of... decisions holding that.., no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he had been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel.

[However,] [i]t is one thing to hold that every defendant ... has the right to the
assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defen-

